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09/764,618	01/17/2001	George Likourezos	1002	7876
7590 GEORGE LIKOUREZOS, ESQ. 261 WASHINGTON AVENUE			EXAMINER	
			GRAHAM, CLEMENT B	
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The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

1	UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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4	BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
5	AND INTERFERENCES
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8	Ex parte GEORGE LIKOUREZOS and MICHAEL A. SCATURRO
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11	Appeal 2007-2742
12	Application 09/764,618
13	Technology Center 3600
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15	
16	Decided: January 10, 2008
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18	
	re MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, HUBERT C. LORIN, and
20ANT	ON W. FETTING, Administrative Patent Judges.
21FET	TING, Administrative Patent Judge.

22 DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING

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The Appellants filed an APPELLANTS' REQUEST FOR REHEARING 25UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.52 on October 26, 2007¹.

The Examiner rejected claims 1-31 in the Final Rejection, mailed May 6, 2005. 27We affirmed these rejections in our August 22, 2007 Decision. The Appellants 28seek reconsideration of the decision to affirm these rejections.

¹¹ The Request included a Certificate of Mailing with a date of October 22, 2007.

1 We have considered the Appellants' arguments, but DENY the REQUEST 2FOR REHEARING.

3 ISSUES

- 4 The Appellants argue that the Board misconstrued the terms "account" and 5"funds" in claims 1, 14, 21, 24, 28, 30 and misapprehended the prior art references.
- 6 The issue pertinent to this request is whether the Appellants have sustained 7their burden of showing that we misapprehended the law, the art, or the claims and 8thus erred in sustaining the rejections of claims. 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(1).

9 ANALYSIS

- 10 Independent Claims 1 and 14
- 11 The Appellants's arguments with respect to claim 14 are misplaced. The
 12Appellants did not place the Board in a position to make a separate determination
 13as to the patentability of claim 14. The Appellants argued claims 1-20 as a group in
 14their Brief and we selected claim 1 as representative of the group and, thus,
 15independent claim 14 stood or fell with claim 1.
- As to claim 1, the Appellants contend that we misapprehended the proper 17construction of the terms "account" and "funds" and the teachings of Bogosian 18regarding credit cards (Request 6:¶B1; 9:¶B2; 13-14: ¶C1). However, the 19Appellants fail to explain, and we do not see, how the construction of these terms 20affects the Board's decision affirming the rejection of claim 1. Regarding the 21teachings of Bogosian, the Appellants do not contend that we misapprehended

1Appellant's arguments in the Brief. As the Decision (p. 14) states, the Appellants 2did not dispute that Bogosian disclosed element [4.a.]; thus, the Appellants did not 3disagree that Bogosian disclosed all the claimed elements. We were not placed in a 4position to consider the teachings of Bogosian regarding credit cards with respect 5to claim 1.

- 6 Independent Claims 21, 28, and 30
- As to each of claims 21, 28, and 30, the Appellants contend that we 8misapprehended the proper construction of the terms "account" and "funds," the 9teachings of Bogosian regarding the necessity for further action by the buyer, and 10the teachings of Bogosian and Hambrecht regarding periodic payments and 11automatic debiting of plural accounts (Request 6.¶ B1; 9.¶ B2; 14-16: ¶ C2). Since 12the contention applies equally to all three claims, we will focus on claim 21; our 13discussion thereto being equally applicable to claims 28 and 30.
- 14 Claim 21, a system claim, required a plurality of electronic auction payment 15accounts configured for storing funds therein. Claim 21 did not require actual 16funds, only that the accounts be configured so as to be able to store funds. We 17construed a payment account as a record of a customer having a business or credit 18relationship. Decision 16; see also FF 04. We also found that storing a credit card 19number inherently stores such a source, and thus an account that is linked to a 20credit card for funds transfer is capable of storing funds (Decision 16: Third ¶). 21This finding simply adds further substance to the property of customer balance 22business accounts that necessarily, for the purposes of generally accepted 23accounting necessities, are able to store customer debit or credit balances of

lamounts owed to or from the business by or to the customer. That is, the capacity 2to record transfers from a credit card implies the capacity to record funds stored in 3a customer balance account.

- 4 The Appellants contend we misconstrued the term "account." (Request 6:First 5¶ 7:First ¶). The Appellants concede that "the specification does not explicitly 6state "an account configured for storing funds there,"" Request 6, but argue that, in 7light of the Specification, the term "account" means "an account configured for 8storing funds therein and not information relating to sources for obtaining money" 9(Request 6). The Appellants rely on the following passage in the Specification for 10support:
- Each electronic auction payment account is configured for storing funds (similar to a bank account) which can be used to effect payment, and not information relating to sources which can be used to initiate payment, such as a [sic]credit card information. Further, each electronic auction payment account is configured for the system 110 to loan funds to, in case there are insufficient funds therein, to effect payment, as described below.

19 However, the Appellants fail to appreciate that the passage relied upon is from 20the DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS 21(Specification 10:8), which describes an embodiment, not a definition of an 22account. The recited passage is internally inconsistent because the second sentence 23in the recited passage allows for just such lending of funds as a credit card would 24provide. This inconsistency is reconciled further in the Specification

The payment registration page 400 also includes several fields 404 for entering credit card information, in order for the computerized electronic auction payment system 110 to charge the user's credit card and deposit funds to the user's electronic auction payment account, prior to the user 102 being deemed a winning bidder for an item won

on the electronic auction web site

8(Specification 14:3-7). Thus, the Specification does not negate the use of a credit 9card for providing funds, but merely bifurcates the storage of customer account 10information into a payment balance account, which does not itself have a credit 11card number, and another customer information storage area, for the same 12customer as the payment account, storing information such as credit card number.

- 13 Accordingly, the Specification does not define a payment account differently 14than as we construed, but describes a preferred embodiment that stores both 15payment and credit card information for a customer. This does not show that we 16misapprehended the claim construction of payment account, or of funds, in claims 1721, 28, or 30, but that a credit card, when linked to a customer account that must 18already necessarily be configured to record customer credit or debit balances and 19therefore be capable of storing funds, provides the same capacity for transferring 20funds from a credit card to the customer payment account as the Specification 21describes. Thus, the Appellants have not shown that we misapprehended the term 22"account"
- As to the argument related to claim 21, that to initiate the extraction of the 24credit card and shipping information from Bogosian's 1-Click settings, the buyer is 25required to perform a manual action following the conclusion of the electronic

1auction (Request 14: Third from last ¶), we find that Bogosian does not require this 2and the Appellants do not point to any portion of Bogosian that shows this to be 3required. The Appellants contend that the name "1-Click" implies that such an 4action must be taken after the auction. While we agree the name implies such an 5action at some point in time, nothing in Bogosian suggests it would not be 6performed at the time of product selection, which would be prior to an auction's 7conclusion. Thus, the Appellants have not shown that we misapprehended 8Bogosian.

- 9 As to the Appellants' argument that neither Bogosian nor Hambrecht show the 10limitation of periodic payment (Request 15: Fourth ¶), we found the Appellants 11admitted this limitation was found in Bogosian (Decision 18). Thus, the 12Appellants have not shown we misapprehended Bogosian in our Decision.
- 13 As to the Appellants' argument that neither Bogosian nor Hambrecht show
 14debiting an account of the plurality of accounts and crediting an account
 15corresponding to the operator, we found this was simply a broader limitation of a
 16limitation in claim 21, which the Appellants have not contended. In any event, one
 17of ordinary skill understands that a customer payment account is debited and some
 18other account, such as a revenue account is credited in any sales transaction.
 19Neither claim 21 nor claim 30 characterized the account that is credited other than
 20that it corresponds to the seller. Clearly, in an auction environment where an
 21offsetting purchase from the seller must be made at the same time as the sales
 22transaction, this purchase transaction would be recorded as a credit to the seller and
 23a debit to purchases. Thus, whether the seller is the intermediary performing the

lauction or the party supplying the auctioned purchase, an account corresponding to 2either such party is credited. The Appellants have not shown that we 3misapprehended Bogosian in our Decision.

- 4 Independent Claim 24
- 5 The Appellants contend that we misapprehended the proper construction of the 6terms "account" and "funds," and the teachings of Hambrecht regarding the 7provision of loans (Request 6:¶B1; 9:¶B2; 16-19: ¶C3).
- 8 We found above that the Appellants did not show that we misapprehended the 9proper construction of account or funds. While claim 24 is a method claim, unlike 10claims 21, 28, and 30 system claims, claim 24, like the system claims, does not 11require that funds be actually in an account. Rather, in claim 24, the method 12determines if funds are in an account and then performs financial transactions if 13they are not. Thus, our analysis and conclusion that we did not misapprehend the 14terms "account" and "funds" as to claims 21, 28, and 30 applies equally to claim 1524.
- 16 The Appellants then contend that we misapprended the availability of margin 17loans in Hambrecht. Claim 24 is directed to a method that loans funds to an 18auction buyer when the buyer has insufficient funds in the buyer's account. 19Hambrecht is a securities auction system that in some circumstances loans funds 20where needed. The Appellants contend that we misapprehended that there is a 21specific statutory prohibition that would preclude certain parties from relying on 22loans in auctions of new securities (Request 16-19; the statutory provision the 23Appellants cite is shown in footnote 5 of Request 16). The Appellants conclude

1that as a result, one of ordinary skill would not have seen Hambrecht as suggesting 2the loan of funds where needed in an auction.

- 3 "The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference 4may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.... Rather, 5the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to 6those of ordinary skill in the art." *In re Keller*, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
- Thus, the test for obviousness of claim 24 is not whether the specific equity 8securities of Hambrecht could be bodily incorporated into Bogosian's auctions or 9even into security auctions in general. Rather the test is what the combined 10teachings would have suggested to one of ordinary skill. As we found in our 11Decision, Hambrecht's users who are able to access credit if needed may rely on a 12broker to ensure there are adequate funds. Decision 17, Hambrecht's claim 36 13describes permitting extension of credit to a qualified purchaser. The Appellants 14contend we misapprehended Hambrecht's claim 36 in that Hambrecht would 15require full settlement of payment prior to a margin loan (Request 18:Bottom \P). 16However, the Appellants recite no portion of Hambrecht to support this contention, 17but simply infer that Hambrecht would so operate. Thus, the Appellants have not 18shown that we misapprehended the applicability of Hambrecht's description of 19loaning funds in an auction environment or that one of ordinary skill would not 20have taken at least the suggestion of such loans in auction environments and 21applied that suggestion to Bogosian as an alternative to Bogosian's own taught 22loaning from credit cards.
- For the above reasons, the Appellants' Request for Rehearing is denied.

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4	DECISION
5	To summarize, our decision is as follows:
6	We have considered the REQUEST FOR REHEARING
7	• We DENY the request that we reverse the Examiner as to claims 1-31.
8	• The rejection of claims 1-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
9	Bogosian and Hambrecht remains sustained.
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11	REHEARING DENIED
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